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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide one potential theoretical explanation for questions 
how asset bubbles come about, why it persists, and what caused it to burst. We propose a 
new model of bubbles and crashes. We divide the risky assets into two classes, the bubble 
asset and the non-bubble asset, and the risk-free asset. Investors are divided into two 
groups, the rational investors and the noise traders. The rational investors maximize their 
expected utility of their wealth in the next period. Noise traders maximize their random 
utility of binary choice: holding the bubble asset and holding the risk-free asst.   
We demonstrate that noise-traders’ herd behavior, which follows the behavior getting a 
majority, occurs when the number of noise-traders increases, and their herd behavior gives 
cause to a bubble, and their momentum trading prolongs bubble. However, rising stock 
price slows down as the noise-trader’s behavior approaches to a stationary state, so that the 
price momentum begins to decrease in the second half of bubble. We demonstrate that 
decreasing the price momentum lead to market crash.  
  
 
1. Introduction  
  
In the last few decades, the asset markets have been frequently visited by bubbles 
and the subsequent crashes. The increasingly frequent market crashes have 
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attracted the attention of academics and policy makers. Although many academics, 
practitioners and policy makers have studied questions related to collapsing asset 
price bubbles, the questions, how asset bubbles come about, why it persists, and 
what caused it to burst, have been the greatest myths.  What is the origin of 
bubbles? Why asset prices are deviated away from fundamental value and what 
might have triggered the speculative mania?   
 
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) extracted hedge fund holdings from Form 13F, 
including those of well-known managers such as Soros, Tiger, Tudor, and others in 
the period of the internet bubble2 from 1998 to 2000. They found that, over the 
sample period 1998 to 2000, many hedge fund managers tried to ride rather than 
attack bubbles, suggesting the existence of mechanisms that non-rational investors 
to surf bubbles rather than attempt to arbitrage them. Using manager age as a 
proxy for experience, Greenwood and Nagel (2008) study the portfolio decisions of 
experienced and inexperienced mutual fund managers during the internet bubble of 
1998 to 2000. They found that at the start of the bubble, younger managers, who 
have not yet directly experienced the consequences of a stock market downturn, 
show little deviation from older managers, but leading up to the peak in March 2000, 
younger managers strongly increase their holdings of technology, while older 
managers do not. And then young managers decrease them during the downturn. 
Brennan (2004) also proposes that increased stock market participation by 
individuals with little investment experience may have been the driving factor of the 
internet bubbles. Another recent growing body of literature is also devoted to the 
existence of the momentum trading (also referred to as positive-feedback trading). 
Many empirical studies documents that the momentum in stock prices is positive in 
the short term, but eventually reversed in the long term. Among many literatures, 
the existence of the short-run momentum in stock prices is documented by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and the long-run reversal in stock prices is 
documented by DeBondt and Thaler (1985).  Many researchers believe that the 
                                                  
2 It is widely believed that the internet stocks were in the midst of stock price bubble in the 1999 to 2000 
period. The internet bubble is investigated by Ofek and Richardson (2003), and Battalio and Schultz (2006).  
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empirical evidences on the momentum trading (positive feedback trading) prove the 
existence of the traders’ herd behavior, and herding have potential to explain 
speculative bubbles (see for example, DeLong et al. (1990)). These empirical findings 
are consistent with experiments in laboratory asset markets conducted. Smith, 
Suchanek, and Williams (1988) find that (a) bubbles and crashes occur regularly in 
laboratory asset markets when market participants are inexperienced, but (b) price 
gradually approach fundamentals when the participants, who have experienced 
bubbles and crashes in prior trading sessions, interact repeatedly in similar markets.  
Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair (2009) finds that the investors’ expectations of prices 
are adaptive, and primarily based on past trends in the current and previous 
markets in which they have participated. Most traders do not anticipate market 
downturns the first time they participate in a market, and are more prone to the 
optimism that fuels the bubble. In the opposite direction, when experienced, they 
typically overestimate the time remaining before market peaks and downturns 
occur.  In summary, the studies mentioned above indicate that the bubble is caused 
by the non-rational investors who attempt to surf bubble.  
 
In this paper we propose a model to explore a mechanism of the subsequent 
collapse of bubble. Our model has several advantages that are absent from popolar 
models of asset bubbles (for examples, DeLong et al. (1990), and Abreu and 
Brunnermeier (2003)). We consider that investors trade three assets: the bubble 
asset the non-bubble asset, and the risk-free asset. Investors are divided into two 
groups, rational investors and noise traders. The rational investors are 
corresponded to experienced managers who have directly experienced the 
consequences of asset market crashes while noise traders are young managers who 
have not yet directly experienced the consequences of a stock market downturn. In 
accordance with traditional asst-pricing models (see e.g., Mossin (1966) and Lintner 
(1969)), the rational investors chooses that the portfolio of three assets, bubble asset, 
non-bubble asset and the risk-free asset which will maximize his expected utility of 
end-of-period wealth. On the other hand, noise traders maximize their random 
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utility3 of alternatives, that is, holding bubble stocks and holding the risk-free asset. 
We assume that a noise trader’s decision-making is influenced by (i) the decisions of 
the other noise-traders, and (ii) the return momentum on the bubble asset which is 
defined as the exponential moving average of the price changes. The noise-trader’s 
utility function of an alternative is composed of those two attributes, and random 
variable.  In our model, we show that as the interaction among noise traders is 
strengthened, the extent, that each noise-trader is influenced by the decisions of 
other noise-traders, is reinforced, and noise traders begin to follow the herd. In the 
attribute (ii), we also assume that the noise-traders’ expectation of bubble stock 
prices is adaptive. The noise-traders adapt the positive feed-back strategy 
(momentum strategy) on the bubble asset. Our model indicates a mechanism that 
that noise-traders’ herd behavior, which follows the behavior getting a majority, 
and their momentum trading, gives cause to a bubble ended up with a crash.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The model is described in Section 2. In Section 3, 
and in Section 4 we give a theoretical explanation on a mechanism of bubble and 
crash. We give concluding remarks in Section 5.  
 
2. Model  
 
Consider the risky assets, and the risk-free asset labeled f. We divided the 
risky assets into two classes: the bubble asset labeled 1 and the non-bubble asset 
labeled 2 which are portfolios of stocks in corresponding sectors. We also divide into 
two groups of investors with different decision making. The first group of investors 
is a group of rational investors who maximize their expected utility of wealth in the 
next period. The second group of investors is the group of the noise-traders who 
maximize the random utility of the binary choice: holding the bubble asset and 
holding the risk-free asset, and trades the bubble asst and the risk-free asset.  
 
                                                  
3 The qualitative choice models based on maximization of the agent’s random utility has been  
developed by McFadden (1974) .  
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2.1 Rational investors 
 
Let us consider the behavior of rational-investors. We shall assume that there is 
a number M of rational investors. Their object is to maximize the expected utility 
1( )tEU W + of wealth 1+tW  in the next period, t+1 by selecting a portfolio mix of the 
two different types of the risky assets and the risk-free asset labeled f. We assume 
that rational investor’s preferences are characterized by the constant-absolute risk 
aversion (CARA) utility with the coefficient of risk aversion, g . The rational 
investors are assumed to be identical. We consider the behavior of the 
representative-rational investor hereafter. The maximization problem which the 
rational investors solve is equivalent to the mean-variance model. That is, in his 
choice among all the possible portfolios, the rational investor is satisfied to be guided 
by its expected yields ( )tE W and its variance ( )tV W .  
1 2
1, ,
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1
( ) ( ) ( )2
. . ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
t t ft
t t tx x x
t t t t t t ft ft
Max EU W Max E W V W
s t p x x p x x q x x
g
+
- - -
ì ü= -í ýî þ
- + - + - =
                            (1) 
 
where an investor’s wealth is written as 1 1 2 2( )t t t t t ft ftW p x p x p x= + + where jtx denotes 
the demand for the asset j in the period t, and jtp denotes the unit price of the asset j 
during the period t, and q denotes the unit price of a risk-free asset.  We assume 
without loss of generality that q is constant for all t. The expected value of the 
wealth 1( )tE W + , and the variance of the wealth 1( )tV W +  is defined as  
1 1 1 1 2 2 1
2 2 12 21 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ,
( ) ( ) ( )
t t t t t ft
t t t t t t t
E W x E p x E p x
V W x x x x x xs r r s
+ + +
+
= + +
= + + +  
where 1( )jtE p + is the expected value of 1jtp +  ( 1,2)j =  , 2js the variance of 1jtp + , and  
ijr the covariance of 1itp + and 1jtp + .  
The corresponding first-order conditions are:   
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      1 0
f
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where m denotes the Lagrangian. Demands for the bubble asset and non-bubble 
asset of the optimal portfolio are:  
        2 121 21 1 1 2 2 11 { ( ) ( ) }t tt t t
p px E p E pA q qs rg + +
æ ö æ ö= - - -ç ÷ ç ÷è ø è ø
 
       2 212 12 2 1 1 1 11 { ( ) ( ) }t tt t t
p px E p E pA q qs rg + +
æ ö æ ö= - - -ç ÷ ç ÷è ø è ø
                                      (3) 
       1 21 1 1 1 2 2 1( ) ( )t tft ft t t t t
p px x x x x xq q- - -= + - + -   
where 
2 12
1
21 2
2
A s rr s= . 
From equations (3), the expected risk premium is calculated as  
1 1 1
1 1
1
( ) /[ ] t tt f
t
E p p qE r r p
+
+
æ ö-- = ç ÷è ø , 
2 2
2 1
2
( ) /[ ] t tt f
t
E p p qE r r p+
æ ö-- = ç ÷è ø .                 (4) 
Therefore, the rational investors’ transaction depends on the expected risk 
premiums of risky assets.  The excess demands for three assets by rational investors 
are calculated by subtracting jtx from 1jtx +  
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The aggregated excess demands for the risky assets by rational investors are 
obtained by multiplying the number M  of rational investors:  
 
 
2 12
1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2
2 21
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where 1it it itx x x -D = - , 1 1jt jt jtp p p+ +D = -  and 1 1( ) ( ) ( )jt jt jtE p E p E p+ +D = -  
 
2.2. Noise traders 
 
There is a large number N of noise traders who is inexperienced and have not yet 
directly experienced the consequences of a market downturn. Each noise-trader is 
assumed to choose the bubble asset or the risk-free asset for each period. That is, 
each of them is a holder of the bubble asset or a holder of the risk-free asset.  
We consider that the individual noise trader maximizes his/her random utility of the 
alternatives, that is, holding the bubble asset and holding the risk-free asset. The 
noise trader chooses an asset with the highest utility4. The noise-trader’s random 
utility function is composed of the deterministic part which is assumed to represent 
average behavior, and a nondeterministic part to represent random deviations from 
this average. The random utility of alternatives is given as:  
                                                  
4 The random utility function of discrete choice developed by McFadden (1974) who has developed 
qualitative choice models based on maximization of the agent’s random utility. 
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U U
U U
e
e
+ + +
- - -
ì = +ïí = +ïî
.                                                                                 (7) 
where ie  is a random variable. The noise trader attaches a value, iU  to each of two 
alternatives, that is, holding the bubble stocks (labeled +) and holding the risk-free 
asset (labeled－).  
A common procedure used in both economics and finance is to assume the 
existence of a “representative” or “average” individual who is assumed to have 
tastes equal to the average over all decision makers. Two possible explanations for 
the stochastic term are given by Hausman and Wise (1978). The first is that a noise 
trader behaves randomly, perhaps due to random firing of neurons; so that faced 
repeatedly with the same alternative set. The same individual makes different 
choices. Second is that there are unobserved characteristics of the individual and 
unobserved attributes of the alternatives. Given the specification of the utility 
function, each noise trader is assumed to choose the alternative that maximizes his 
utility. The maximization of the random utility gives the probability with which 
each alternative is chosen. The probability that he chooses each alternative is given 
as :  
Pr[ ] Pr[ ]
Pr[ ] Pr[ ]
P U U U U
P U U U U
e e
e e
+ + - + - - +
- - + - + + -
ì = > = - ³ -ïí = > = - ³ -ïî
                                            (8) 
where 1P P+ -+ = .  
We assume that individual noise trader’s decision-making is influenced by (i) the 
other noise-traders and (ii) the return momentum on the bubble asset. To describe a 
noise-trader’s utility function which is composed of those determinants, let us 
introduce a new variable s  that denotes the normalized excess of the bubble-asset 
holders over holders of risk-free asset which is defined as ( ) /t t ts n n N+ -= -  where  
tn+  is the number of bubble stocks holders, tn-  is number of traders, possessing by 
risk-free asset in the period t. Obviously t tn n N+ -+ º . Using the variable ts , we 
rewrite the equation (8),  
 9 
( )
t t
t t
U s H
U s H
l
l
+
-
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                                                                          (9) 
where the parameter l is assumed to be positive and constant. Givenl is a positive, 
an increase in ts raises the utility of holding the bubble asset, and reduces the utility 
of holding the risk-free asset in the direction of the minority decision. This means 
that the noise trader has a tendency to be in favor of the majority decision. 
tH denotes the return momentum of the bubble asset which is defined as the 
exponential moving average of the risk premium of the bubble asset,  
 
0
(1 ) ( )it t i f
i
H r rq q¥ -
=
= - -å .                                                                  (10) 
where fr denotes the interest rate of the risk free asset. The return momentum tH of 
the bubble asset is equivalent to  
1 1 0 0(1 ) ( ),t t t f tH H r r H Hq q- - == - + - =                                             (11) 
where 0 1q< < . It means that the noise-trader’s expectation on the risk premium is 
adaptive.   
As the return momentum tH  of the bubble asset is higher, the utility of holding 
the bubble asset raises, and the utility of holding the risk-free asset is reduced. The 
equations (10), (11) means that the noise-traders adapt momentum strategies which 
are a strategy that buys assets with high capital gains and sells assets with poor 
capital gains over the previous periods5.  
McFadden (1974) has shown that if the random variable ie are independently 
and identically distributed with the Gumbell  distribution 
( ) Pr[ ] exp[ exp[ ]]iF e e e eº £ = - - .                                                 (12) 
The probability that a utility-maximizing noise trader will choose each alternative, 
is expressed as:  
                                                  
5 The fact that momentum strategies yield significant profits, have been well investigated.  Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) examine a variety of momentum strategies and document that strategies earn 
profits.  
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exp[ ]
exp[ ] exp[ ]
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exp[ ] exp[ ]
UP U U
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+
+
+ -
-
-
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                                                                (13) 
 
Now we introduce a variable n which is the probability that a transition is 
attempted by one of the noise-traders, and follows a uniform distribution over noise-
traders. We assume that one noise-trader attempts a trade in one time unit. The 
individual transition probabilities per an unit time period is described as  
exp[ ( )]( ) exp[ ] exp[ ( )]
exp[ ]( ) exp[ ] exp[ ( )]
t t
t
t t t t
t t
t
t t t t
s Hp s s H s H
s Hp s s H s H
ln l l
ln l l
¯
­
- +ì = ×ï + + - +ïí +ï = ×ï + + - +î
                                 (14) 
The random variable n  determines the time scale in which a transition which is 
attempted by a noise trader occurs.  
( )tp s¯ is the transition probability that one of the noise traders who hold the 
bubble asset sells his bubble asset, and alternatively hold the risk-free asst. Inversely 
( )tp s­  the transition probability that one of the noise traders who hold the risk-free 
asset sells his risk-free asset and hold the bubble asset.   
The effects of l and tH on the transition probabilities can be described as 
follows: 
 
i) A positive l enlarges the transition probability in favor of the majority 
choice and reduces the transition probability in the direction of the minority 
choice. This positive feedback effect grows for a growing imbalance of 
choices. 
ii) A positive momentum tH increases the probability that a noise trader 
changes from holding the risk-free asset to holding the bubble asset, and 
reduces the probability of changing from holding the bubble asset to 
holding the risk-free asset, and vice versa for negative tH .  
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Using the transition probabilities, the equation for the distribution ( )tp s of stochastic 
process of s is described by  
            1( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )][ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
t t t t t t
t t t t
p s p s w s s p s s w s p s
w s s p s s w s p s
+ ¯ ¯
­ ­
- = +D + D -
+ -D -D -                (15) 
where 
[( ) ] ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )2
( ) (( ) ) ( ) (1 ) ( )2
( ) ( ( )) ( ) (1 ( )) ( )2
( ) ( ( )) ( ) (1 ( ))2
t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t
t t t t t t
Nw s s s w s n p s s p s
Nw s w s s s n p s s p s
Nw s s w s s s n p s s s s p s s
Nw s s w s s s n p s s s s p
-
¯ ¯ ¯
+
­ ­ ­
-
¯ ¯ ¯
+
­ ­
-D ¬ º = = +
º + D ¬ = = -
+ D º ¬ +D = + D = + +D +D
-D º ¬ -D = -D = - -D ( )
( ) 0
t
t t t t
s s
w s s for s s s
­
ìïïïïïïíïï -Dïï ¢ ¢¬ = ¹ ±Dïïî
      (16) 
where / 2s ND = . 
The equation (15) is called as the master equation (See Gardiner (1985)). When the 
number of noise traders is large, the equation (15) is equivalent to the dynamic 
equation of the mean tˆs of ( )tp s  (see Weidlich and Haag (1983)),  
 
1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ tanh( ) ]t t t t t ts s s s H sn l+ +D º - = + -                                (17) 
 
where ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) /t t ts n n N+ -= - . ˆtn+ denotes the number of noise traders who hold the bubble 
asset at the period t, and ˆtn-  denotes the number of noise traders who hold the risk 
free asset. The solution of (17) corresponds to the maximum of the stationary 
distribution ( )st tp s  of the master equation (15), and the equation of (17) describes 
the collective behavior of the representative noise-trader.  
Using the difference of tˆs from period t to period t+1, the aggregate excess 
demand for the bubble asset by all noise traders is defined as  
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( )1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ2t t t t
QNQ n n s s+ +- -é ù- = -ë û                                                  (18) 
 
 where the parameter Q denotes the number of shares of the bubble asset which is 
exchanged in any transaction by a noise trader, and is assumed to be constant. The 
equation (18) will be utilized when the market prices of the risky assets are 
calculated under the market clearing conditions in section 2.4.  
 
2.3. Collective behavior of the representative noise-traders 
 
Before we discuss about bubbles and crashes, we describe the collective behavior of 
the representative noise-traders using equation (17).  As the above conditions i) and 
ii) indicate, the noise-trader’s transition probability depends on the variables  
l and tH . For simplicity of analysis, let us assume that the return momentum tH is a 
parameterH . The solutions of the mean equation (17) can be summarized with 
respect to l andH  as follows:  
 
i) The case of 10 << l  and arbitraryH :  
There is only one possible solution **s . The solution corresponds to the 
maximum of the stationary distribution ( )st tp s . For 0tH = and 10 << l , 
the only one possible solution is zero.  
In this case which the relatively small number of the noise-traders 
participate into trade, the driving force of the collective behavior of noise-
traders mainly the return momentum H  but strong herding among noise-
traders dose not function.  In Figure 1 the graphical solution to (17) is 
plotted for 1l < and the different values of H .  When the return 
momentum H is positive (negative), the solution moves from zero to a 
positive value (a negative value).  
 
ii) The case of 1>l  and H H< : 
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H is determined by the equation lll =-- ])1([cosh2 H . There are three 
possible solutions * ** ***s s s< < .  The solution *s and ***s are called the bear-
market equilibrium and the bull-market equilibrium respectively. 
Therefore, as the parameter l increases, the solution **s  is unstable, and 
appears the bear-market equilibrium *( 0)s < and bull-market 
equilibrium ***( 0)s > . As l exceeds unity, the stationary distribution ( )st tp s  
is from unimodal to multimodal. This bifurcation is called as the second-
order phase transition. In Figure 2 the graphical solution to (17) is plotted 
for 1l > . 
 
iii) The case of 1>l and H H= :  
 Two of the tree solutions * ** ***s s s< < coincide at ( 1) /cs l l= ± - .  
An increase (a decrease) in the return momentum H  causes the curve 
which indicates the transcendental equation (17) to shift up (down), so that 
the solutions rise (fall).   Figure 3 shows the states that two of the tree 
solutions coincide.  
 
iv) There case of 1>l  and H H> :  
There is one solution again. When 1>l , and H  is negative and decreasing 
continuously, the stationary distribution ( )st tp s  is from multimodal to 
unimodal. The solution jumps down from ***s to *s  at the moment that the 
return moment H  falls below H- . Inversely, the solution jumps up 
from *s to ***s at the moment that or that the return moment H  exceeds H+ . 
This bifurcation is called as the first-order phase transition.  
 
2.4. Market-clearing prices  
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The market clearing condition requires that the aggregated excess demand (supply) 
for each asset by rational investors is equal to the aggregated excess demand 
(supply) by noise traders from the period t-1 to the period t. That is, if one noise-
trader changes from a holder of the risk-free asset to a holder of the bubble stocks, 
then the prices are adjusted such that rational investors supply the corresponding 
number of the bubble stocks. The market clearing conditions are described as  
   
2 121 2
1 2 1 1 2 1
12 21 2
2 1 1 1 2 1
ˆ ˆ[ ( ( ) ) ( ( ) )] 02 2
[ ( ( ) ) ( ( ) )] 0
t t
t tt t t t
t t
t t t
p pQN M QNM x s E p E p sA q q
p pMM x E p E pA q q
s rg
r sg
+ +
+ +
D Dì D + D = D - - D - + D =ïïí D Dï D = - D - + D - =ïî
                                                                                                  
(19) 
Solving the equations (19) with respect to the price changes on the risky assets 
, ( 1, 2)itp iD =  we can obtain the price changes of the risky assets which satisfy the 
market-clearing conditions. In summary, the dynamics of stock markets can be 
described as:  
 
2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12
2 2 2 1 2 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
ˆ[ ( )]
ˆ[ ( )]
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[tanh( ) ]
[( ) ]
t t t t t
t t t t t
t t t t t t
t t t t f t
p p p q s E p
p p p q s E p
s s s s H s
H H H r r H
g s k
g r k
n l
q
- +
- +
- - -
- - -
ìD º - = D + DïD º - = D + DïíD º - = + -ïïD º - = - -î
                                                     (20) 
 
where 2
QN
Mk = . We assume that the term 1( )jtE p +D , which is the change of the 
fundamental prices of the risky assets. The terms are often considered as a random 
variable which fluctuates. However, for simplicity of analysis, we consider the terms 
are constant over time, that is, 1( ) 0, ( 1,2)jtE p j+D = = .  Then, the price changes of 
the risky assets depend completely on tˆsD . Since 21 0qgs k > , the price change 1tpD  of 
the bubble asset increases (decreases) proportionally with respect to tˆsD , and 
for 12 0r > (for 12 0r < ),the price change 1tpD of the non-bubble asset is positively 
(negatively) correlated with tˆsD . If one noise-trader changes from a holder of the 
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risk-free asset to a holder of the bubble asset, then the price 1tp of the bubble asset 
rises by 21 0Qq Mgs ´ > , and the price 2tp of the non-bubble asset rises (falls) by 
12 Qq Mgr ´  for
12 0r > ( 12 0r < ).  
 
3. How does bubble come about?  
 
As discussed in subsection 2.3., when the parameter l exceeds unity, the unique 
solution **( 0)s =  is unstable, and appears newly two solutions, the bear-market 
solution *( 0)s < and bull-market solution ***( 0)s >  both of which are stable, under 
0tH = . (See Figure 4.) Let us consider the motion of the prices of the bubble asset 
starting from the unstable solution **( 0)s = . Depending on the value of 0ˆs  at the 
initial time, the bubble asset can either enter a bull market or a bear market. That is, 
when the initial value of 0ˆs  is positive, the price of the bubble asset raise, and enter a 
bubble phase, and visa versa. Run-up in the bubble-asset price 1tp  is due to 
increases in the noise-traders’ excess demand ˆ( / 2)tQN sD for the bubble asset, and it 
increases the return momentum tH . The increases in the momentum tH  next pull 
up toward the bull-market solution ***( 0)s > . The aggregate demand for the bubble 
asset by noise-traders is increased further due to the noise traders’ herding. As the 
noise-traders’ excess demand for the bubble asset is positive and increases, the price 
1tp of the bubble asset increases and is over-evaluated. Thus, the 
momentum tH increases in the first half of bubbles. This inflationary spiral gives 
cause to the asset bubble. For 1>l and tH H>  the bear-market equilibrium 
disappears, and the bull-market equilibrium is unique and stable. Thus, the bubble 
persists until the imbalance of buyers and sellers over the noise traders, 
tˆs approaches to the bull-market equilibrium ***( 0)s > . (See Figure 5.) 
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The expected risk premium is described as  
1 1 1
1 1
1
( ) /[ ] t tt f
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+
+
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2 2
2 1
2
( ) /[ ] t tt f
t
E p p qE r r p+
æ ö-- = ç ÷è ø         (21) 
In the period of bubbles, the actual high return on the bubble asset is earned as the 
result of low expected future returns. That is, rational investors sell the bubble asset 
because of the lower expected risk premium, and in the opposite direction, more 
noise traders buy the bubble asset more due to rises in the utility of holding the 
bubble asset. As a result, the noise traders get a capital gain from the price run-up 
in the period of bubbles. The actual price change 1tpD of the bubble asset is contrary 
to the rational investors’ expectation in the period of bubbles.   
Many recent academic articles have argued that after the increases in stock prices 
over the last decade, the expected equity premium is low and perhaps negative (Lee, 
Myers and Swaminathan (1999); Fama and French (2000); Shiller (2000)). Our 
model gives a persuasive explanation on the risk premium puzzle.  
Then, consider the case that the bubble asset has a weak positive correlation 
with the non-bubble asset, 12 0r >  historically. As the noise-traders’ excess demand 
for the bubble asset increases, the price of the non-bubble asset 2tp increases slightly 
reflecting the weak positive-correlation.  
 
4. Why do bubbles burst?  
 
In the first half of bubbles, the noise-traders’ excess demand for the bubble asset is 
sharply increasing, so that the price of the bubble asset is also sharply increasing, 
but in the second half of bubbles, as the noise-traders’ imbalance tˆs excess demand 
for the bubble asset is approaching the bull market equilibrium ***s , the noise-
traders’ excess demand tˆsD excess demand for the bubble asset is approaching zero, 
and so a rise in the bubble-asset price slows down.  
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Decreasing the momentum tH changes the bull-market equilibrium ***s  
downward, so that the noise traders’ excess demand tˆsD  for the bubble asset 
declines, and the bubble-asset price starts to decrease.  As the momentum 
tH decreases, the bear-market equilibrium *s appears again. This deflationary 
spiral continues to decrease and become negative in its final stage of bubbles. until. 
A crash can be suddenly caused by a trifling bad in the end stage of bubbles when 
the return momentum  tH declines until tH H= - . In an instant when tH falls below 
H- , the probability of the noise trader’s selling the bubble asset is higher than the 
probability of the noise trader’s buying the bubble asset. In our model the market 
crash is considered as the so called first-order phase transition. (See Figure 5.) The 
noise traders’ selling on balance in the period of a crash depends on the parameter 
l . The noise-traders’ panic selling of the bubble asset give also rise to the decline in 
the price of non-bubble asset reflecting a historically positive correlation, 12 0r > . 
Therefore, the crash is a "contagious" market-wide phenomenon.  
After a crash, the rational investors buy the bubble asset, which they sell and/or 
went short in the period of bubbles, back when the expected risk premium (21) is 
positive. After all, the rational investors can make a profit from a long-term 
investment, while the noise-traders lose money.   
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
 
This paper provides one potential theoretical explanation for asset bubble and crash. 
A merit of this paper is to propose that a model describing the rationality of the 
noise trader’s behavior, and a mechanism of bubble and carash which is caused by 
the noise trader’s behavior.  
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          Figure 1: The solutions of the equation (17) for 1l < and the three values ofH .  
    The straight line is 45 degree line.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The solutions of the equation (17) for 1l > and 0H = . The straight 
line is 45 degree line.  
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Figure 3: The solutions of the equation (17) for 1l > and H H= ± . The straight 
line is 45 degree line.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The solutions of the equation (17) for 1l > and 1l < . The figure 
indicates the relationship of  H to the equiribria.  
( )H H= +
** ***s s=
tˆs
1tˆs -
'B
'B
***s
* **s s=
''B
''B
( )H H= -
0
tH
tˆs 'C
C
C
'C
0
( 1)l >
( 1)l <
 22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The dynamics of (20) for 1l > and 1( ) 0jtE p +D = . Bubble and Crash.  
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